Step-parent adoption happens where a child is adopted by the spouse or civil union partner of a biological parent. This is a drastic invasion into the life of a child because (except if provided for otherwise) an adoption order terminates all parental responsibilities and rights any person had in respect of a child immediately before the adoption, and confers full parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the adopted child upon the adoptive parent. Under specific circumstances an adoption order may also be rescinded, again disrupting the life of the child dramatically. Because of the immense impact on a child, the rescission of an adoption order has to be handled with kid gloves.
Introduction
There could be a number of reasons why a step-parent wishes to adopt a child, including a desire to provide stability to the child, love for the child, and love for the biological parent of the child. Williams 1 highlights the following reasons why a step-parent may adopt: there may be considerable hostility and bitterness between the mother and natural father, and she may wish to have no more to do with him; the children may be emotionally disturbed by visits from their father; the stepfather may wish to have the security of an order, not only so that he feels that the children "belong" to him, but also because he would then automatically be entitled to custody of them should the mother die or become incapacitated; the mother and husband may start a new family and wish all the children to be integrated into one unit; they may wish the children to be known by the husband's surname; it may, quite simply, be very inconvenient to the mother and husband for the father to have access to the children. What makes step-parent adoption different to other forms of adoption is that there is often a biological parent, other than the one married to the stepparent, who is still involved in the child's life. Such adoption thus leads to the termination of an existing relationship, not necessarily for the right reasons. For instance, a biological father may agree to a step-parent adoption in order to avoid paying maintenance for the child.
In the matter under discussion a stepfather had adopted the two children of his spouse. However, GT v CT 2 did not deal with the adoption of the children, but with an application for the rescission of the adoption orders. This case is extremely important. There is very little authority with regard to step-parent adoption since the implementation of the Children's Act, 3 and there is a complete lack of authority when it comes to the rescission of adoption orders. In fact, Mokgoatlheng J was quoted as saying that the case was the most difficult he had had to hear, and that he had had to conduct extensive research. 3 2 The case
Facts
The first and second respondents (the children's biological mother and father respectively) 5 were married. When they divorced in 2005 they had a son, E. At the time of the divorce the mother was expecting their daughter, I. Upon the divorce the mother was awarded care (previously custody) of both children. The applicant 6 and the mother met whilst the latter was pregnant with I, and they got married in 2006. In 2007 the stepfather adopted both children with the consent of both the mother and the biological father. The biological father continued to have contact with and also paid maintenance in respect of E, who still regarded him as his father. With regard to I, who regarded her stepfather as her father and had emotionally bonded with him, the biological father did not exercise contact. The stepfather and the mother divorced in 2008. The mother was awarded the care of children.
The stepfather alleged that the mother had not allowed him to exercise his parental responsibilities and rights towards the children during the subsistence of their marriage and after the divorce. She had undermined him, had made all the decisions and, after their separation and later their divorce, she had prevented him from having contact with the children. He further alleged that she had told him that he could not exercise any parental rights, obligations and responsibilities over the children without her consent as he was not their biological father, and that the biological father enjoyed precedence 7 over him regarding the children's social and educational lives. 8 After the divorce, the first and second respondents enjoyed the benefit of the parental relationship with the children but left the financial obligations in respect of their welfare and maintenance to the stepfather. 9 The stepfather thus ceased to have any meaningful physical contact with them after his separation from the mother. He no longer wished to have any physical or emotional contact or a parent-child relationship with the children and believed that it would be in the best interests of the children if the adoption orders were rescinded. As a result he instituted an 5 Hereafter referred to as "mother" and "biological father".
6
Hereafter referred to as "stepfather".
7
The parental responsibilities and rights of the biological father in fact no longer existed after the adoptions by the stepfather -also see Sonnekus 2015 TSAR 892. application for the rescission of the adoption orders in 2013, more than six years after the adoption orders had been handed down.
The mother and the biological father did not oppose the application for rescission, but the third respondent, the Registrar of Adoptions, 10 did. The Registrar objected on several grounds. The application had been instituted six years after the adoptions had been granted -long after the expiry of the prescription period for rescission in section 243(2) of the Children's Act.
11 The Registrar further argued that the stepfather, who still loved the children and remained a father figure to them until December 2012, 12 seemed to be motivated in his application by his unwillingness to continue paying maintenance, but that it was impermissible for the stepfather to sever "his adoptive parental responsibilities" 13 because of financial considerations.
14 The Registrar also averred that the setting aside of the adoption orders would not be in the best interests of the children, who still regarded the stepfather as their father, and that the court had a constitutional obligation to protect the children's best interests. 
Judgment
The first issue that Mokgoatlheng J had to consider was that the application had been instituted in contravention of section 243(2) of the Children's Act, as the prescribed period of two years within which to lodge an application for the rescission of an adoption had long passed. The question was thus whether the court had jurisdiction to entertain this application at all, and the judge held that the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 16 must prevail over the provisions of section 243(2) of the Act. 17 He stated that the court had to take into account the paramountcy of 10 Hereafter referred to as "the Registrar".
11
GT v CT para [4] . Although the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 was in operation at the time of the adoptions, it was subsequently repealed by the Children's Act. In terms of s 243(2) of the Children's Act an application for rescission has to be lodged within a reasonable time but not exceeding two years from the date of the adoption.
12
GT v CT para [32] .
13
The words chosen for this statement give the impression that the relationship between a child and an adoptive parent is different from that of a child and a biological parent. The point has to be made that there is no difference when it comes to parental responsibilities and rights between a biological parent and an adoptive parent. 19 Mokgoatlheng J gave quite a detailed outline of why the adoption of the children had in fact not been legal. 20 He also came to the conclusion that the biological father had never relinquished his parental responsibilities, rights and obligations in respect of E.
14

GT v CT
21
The Family Advocate was requested to interview the parties and to compile a report regarding the effect, if any, the rescission of the adoption orders would have on the children. The Family Advocate's finding was that the rescission would not have "any permanent deleterious psychological and emotional effect" on the children, but that it would merely give legal effect to the de facto situation that had existed since the stepfather and the mother separated.
22
The court concluded that the relationship between the stepfather and the children had broken down irretrievably 23 and indicated that the stepfather was not interested in rebuilding the bond between him and the children. 24 It further held that the biological father enjoyed a normal parent-child relationship with both children 25 and that the mother and biological father should be afforded the opportunity to strengthen their already existing parent-child relationship. 26 Consequently, it was ordered that the adoption orders (of E and I) granted on 26 June 2007 in favour of the applicant by the Children's Court are rescinded and set aside with effect from 23 April 2015. He calls it a circumstantial fictional adoption (GT v CT para [43] ) and a purported adoption (para [46] ).
21
GT v CT para [48] . There are of course two children to consider.
22
GT v CT para [55] .
23
GT v CT para [57] . It is disturbing that the court used terminology that is reminiscent of divorce proceedings. You cannot divorce your children.
24
GT v CT para [60] .
25
GT v CT para [59] . Although this seemed to be true of the relationship between the biological father and E, it certainly was not the case with I, who loved her stepfather and regarded him as her father. In fact, her biological father did not "exercise contact" with her -para [22] . The Child Care Act 29 regulated adoption in South Africa from 1 February 1987 until 1 April 2010, when the provisions of the Children's Act, which currently regulates all aspects related to adoption, came into effect. Before considering the judgment any further, there are a few general remarks that need to be made, and inaccuracies and misinterpretations that need to be pointed out. These will be explored in the discussion that follows:
 Mokgoatlheng J, who was also the presiding judge in Maneli v Maneli, another adoption matter that was severely criticised, delivered the judgment.
30
 The court at times cited incorrect legislation.
31
 The court at times referred to the parties incorrectly.
32
 The court used outdated terminology.
33
 Mokgoatlheng J often contradicted himself. The rescission order was quite correctly sought in terms of s 243(1)(c) of the Children's Act, which is currently in force. However, the Children's Act does not apply retrospectively and the court's application of the Children's Act to determine the legality of the adoption itself is faulty. The legislation in operation at the time was the Child Care Act. The court, however, referred to the (il)legality of the adoptions by relying on the Children's Act. Mokgoatlheng J on several occasions referred to the supremacy of the Constitution as provided for in s 2, but his reference to the "section 2 constitutional principle of the supremacy of the principle of the best interests of the children in every matter concerning children" (GT v CT para [18] ) is incorrect. The court indicated that it is "empowered by section 7 of the [Children's] Act to adjudicate this matter pursuant to the constitutional imperative of the principle of the children's best interests" (para [14]), while s 9 in fact provides for the paramountcy of the best interests of the child. S 7 contains the list of factors that must be taken into consideration when the best interests of the child standard is applied. See para [40] ; also see Heaton 2010 Ann Surv S African L 457 for similar criticism of the judgment in Maneli.
32
In GT v CT para [22] the first respondent is referred to as the second applicant, and in para [43] she is called the first applicant.
33
The term "parental authority" has been replaced by "parental responsibilities and rights", but on more than one occasion the court still referred to "parental authority" (GT v CT paras [25] , [27] 
Best interests of the children
Introduction
The standard of the best interests of a child is a constitutional imperative.
37
The child's best interests are of paramount importance 38 in every matter concerning the child. What would be in the best interests of a child in a particular case is not easily determined. It would depend on the circumstances of that case, and has to be determined for each case individually.
39 These interests are a contentious issue that will be debated as long as decisions about children have to be taken. Ultimately, the court is called upon to make a value judgement to determine what is in the best [43] 
36
GT v CT para [52] . Several aspects of this paragraph need further exploration: the mother never stopped being the legal guardian of the children; the adoption was not granted in terms of s 242(2)(a) of the Children's Act; and s 242(1)(a)(b) and (c) of the Children's Act did not terminate the parental responsibilities and rights of the mother. The court indicated that the "legality of the divorce decree settlement agreement awarding custody of [E] and [I] to the first respondent is legally untenable" (para [53] ) and that custody could not have been awarded to the mother (paras [21] , [53] ). This interpretation by the court is mindboggling. When a child (or children) is adopted by a stepfather who is married to the mother, she does not lose her parental authority and rights over that child, either in terms of the Child Care Act -in terms of which the adoptions were granted -or the Children's Act.
37
Section 28(2) of the Constitution.
38
In Fletcher v Fletcher 1948 1 SA 130 (A) the Appellate Division first gave paramountcy to the standard of the best interests of the child. (19) 8 interests of the child, bearing all relevant considerations in mind. 40 This is the "golden thread" enshrined in section 28(2) of the Constitution, which runs through the fabric of our law relating to children.
41
Before the implementation of the Children's Act, there was no statutory recognition of any factors that need to be taken into account when determining the best interests of a child, 42 which made it very difficult to determine these interests. This lacuna was criticised, as the subjective opinions of decision makers could get in the way of objective judgment. 43 Once the Children's Act came into operation, the best interests of the child received further protection. The best interests of the child are now protected not only by section 28(2) of the Constitution, but also by section 9 (read with section 7) of the Children's Act. In terms of section 9 the standard that a child's best interest is of paramount importance in all matters concerning the care, protection and well-being of a child must be applied. Whenever this standard is applied, the list of factors in section 7 must now be taken into consideration where relevant.
Application
In his judgment Mokgoatlheng J emphasised the importance of the best interests of the child, but his interpretation thereof is flawed. When deciding on the role that the best interests of the children have to play, the judge focused on section 28(2) of the Constitution, 44 and hardly considered sections 7 and 9 of the Children's Act. Mokgoatlheng J mentioned section 9 only once, and only in reference to other cases where the best interests of children were at issue. 45 As for section 7, 46 the court in passing mentioned some of the factors that must be considered, 47 but there is no evidence that any of these factors were ever considered. Furthermore, the judge failed to take into consideration the fact that there were two children, who had very different relationships with their stepfather 53 and whose best interests when it came to the rescission of the adoption orders seem to have been very different.
Rescission
An adoption order may be rescinded in terms of section 243 of the Children's Act, provided that the requirements in this section are met. The first of these requirements 54 is that the rescission of the order has to be in the best interests of the child. It was therefore pertinent to consider the best interests of E and I before anything else. This deserves further exploration. Even if the court's interpretation of the application of the best interests of the child standard, namely that it is absolute, is accepted, the facts do not support its contention that the rescission of the adoption orders would be in the best interests of the children. How did the court determine what these best interests are? There is no evidence that the children themselves were ever consulted with regard to their best interests. 55 The court relied on the evidence presented by the adults, all of whom had different agendas and requested the rescission for reasons that do not support the best interests of the children. The Family Advocate and Family Counsellor in their findings indicated that the rescission of the adoption orders would "not have any permanent deleterious psychological and emotional effect" on E and I. 56 This may be true, but that is not the same as the rescission's being in the best interests of the children. Although it seems that there was a strong bond between the biological father and E, 57 there are also numerous references to the bond between the stepfather and the children, especially I, 58 out that rescission would not be in the best interests of the children, as they had bonded with the applicant, whom they still regarded as their father.
59
Besides the best interests of the children, section 243(2) also contains two further requirements before an adoption order may be rescinded, one of which has to be met before the adoption order may be rescinded. Mokgoatlheng J held that, although a court cannot generally exercise its jurisdiction in conflict with a statute, it is enjoined to take into account the paramountcy of the best interests of the child, 60 and where there is an apparent conflict between the provisions of sections of the Children's Act and the Constitution, it (the court) has to intervene. 61 The judge expressed the opinion that sections 2, 62 28(1) 63 and 28(2) of the Constitution "trump the prescriptive peremptory injunction of section 243(2) of the Act", 64 and that these provisions in the Constitution must prevail over the provisions of the Children's Act. The fact of the matter is that adoption is regulated by the Children's Act, not by the Constitution. This is thus incorrect and contrary to his own declaration 65 that the application of the relevant sections involves "the weighing up of various competing interests and rights, and at times the limitation of the children's best interests". Although legislation may of course be declared unconstitutional and thus repealed under specific circumstances, this does not give the court carte blanche to decide to ignore existing legislation. 66 The court ignored section 39(2) of the Constitution, which provides that, when interpreting any legislation and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
67
The best interests of the child as provided for in section 28(2) are paramount, but they are not absolute. 68 The child's best interests are more
59
GT v CT para [34] .
60
GT v CT para [8] .
61
GT v CT para [9] .
62
This section confirms the supremacy of the Constitution.
63
The right of a child to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment.
64
GT v CT para [14] . important than anything else, but everything else is not unimportant. 69 The best interests of the child can be limited in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. 70 To assume that they would trump all other rights and interests would be unpalatable, 71 as it would then become pointless to even consider the rights and interests of other parties, 72 or other legislation.
3.3
Validity and effect of the adoptions
Validity of the adoptions
Something the court paid much (unnecessary) attention to was the validity of the adoptions. There was never any allegation or evidence that the adoptions were not legal. Almost a quarter of the judgment was dedicated to this aspect. Mokgoatlheng J's conclusions in this regard are not only unnecessary but incorrect. He firstly based his argument with regard to the validity of the adoption orders on the provisions of the Children's Act, 73 and secondly he deduced that the first respondent lost her parental responsibilities and rights when the adoption orders were granted. 74 The adoptions had been granted years before, when the Child Care Act was in operation. 75 Once the adoption orders had been granted the children were for all purposes regarded as the children of the adoptive parents and vice versa. 76 The only ways 77 in which these adoption orders "Constitutional and International Protection of Children's Rights" 282-283. Mokgoatlheng J acknowledged this himself in GT v CT para [8] where he said that the court "is enjoined to take into account the paramountcy of the best interests of the children" (my emphasis) and in para [36] where he said that " [t] he fact that the best interests of the child are paramount does not imply that the child's best interest right is absolute". He further said in para [35] that in weighing up the children's best interests in adoption matters, "the court is obliged to consider the effect the rescission of the adoption orders will have on the children, especially where a considerable period of time has elapsed since the granting of such adoption orders and the children have formed a bond with their adoptive parent". In his discussion of the validity of the adoptions, Mokgoatlheng J incorrectly relied on the provisions of the Children's Act. 81 The Children's Act does not have retrospective effect, 82 and the legality and effect of the adoptions were thus determined by section 20(1) of the Child Care Act, not by the provisions of the Children's Act as assumed by the judge. 83 The court alluded to the "purported legality of the award", 84 the "legal fiction regarding … the legality of the efficacy of the de jure adoption", asked whether there was "a bona fide adoption … predicated on section 239(1)(a) of the [Children's] Act", 85 and referred to the adoptions by the court as "forged on an unsound legal and moral foundation", 86 an "abstract circumstantial fictional adoption", 87 a "legal fiction", 88 an "apparent adoption" 89 and a "purported adoption".
90
These inferences are astounding, to say the least, and after deducing that there were no proper adoptions to be rescinded, the court then in its order sets aside the adoptions. Because of the irrelevance with regard to the order made, the serious mistake made by the court regarding the legality of the adoptions will not be explored any further.
Effect of adoptions
A critical error made by Mokgoatlheng J was his interpretation of section 242(1)(a) of the Children's Act, 91 which deals with the effect of an adoption 77 Review was never an option, as an application for review is based on irregularities in court proceedings, which was never alleged in this matter. order, namely that all parental responsibilities and rights of both biological parents are terminated upon adoption. 92 The court deduced that the mother lost her parental responsibilities and rights when the children were adopted by their stepfather. 93 In terms of section 20(1) of the Child Care Act the rights and obligations which existed between a child and any person who was his or her parent immediately before an adoption were terminated by the adoption, except in the case of a step-parent adoption.
94
The mother obviously did not lose her parental responsibilities and rights. The court's interpretation that she lost her parental responsibilities and rights when the children were adopted by their stepfather 95 and its assumptions of the "purported legality of the award of the custody … to the [mother being] in conflict with the adoption orders" 96 as well as the "purported adoption" by the stepfather being a "legal fiction" because "although [the mother] had consented to the adoption of [E] and [I] by the applicant, de facto she never relinquished her parental rights, obligations and responsibilities and 'legal guardianship' as the biological mother" 97 are thus completely wrong. This is so even if one accepted the court's faulty application of the provisions of the Children's Act to the effect of the adoptions, as the preamble of section 242(1), in terms of which an adoption order terminates all parental responsibilities and rights that any person had before an adoption contains an exception to this rule. This exception affords a discretion to the court to order that the usual consequences of an adoption order would not apply, including that a stepparent adoption would automatically terminate all parental responsibilities and rights of the parent to whom the step-parent was married.
98
(a) all parental responsibilities and rights any person, including a parent, step-parent or partner in a domestic life partnership, had in respect of the child immediately before the adoption;" 
